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It is human to hate: Samuel Huntington’s dictum must be borne 
when confronted by outbursts, whose immediacy impels urban – 
not always urbane – netizens to bestow, depending on pet 
peeves or projects, instant adulation or approbation.  
 
Marc Anwar, a Pakistani-born Asian actor on ITV’s long-
running Coronation Street sitcom, enraged at the slaying of 17 
Indian soldiers at an Indian base by armed Pakistani militants, 
was sacked for tweeting epithets labelling Indians (actually, 
Hindus) as pee-drinkers – a familiar refrain about cow-revering 
Hindus among Pakistani ranters on social media. Its antecedent 
though has drained away through the sluices of contemporary 
history.  
 
Irate Pakistanis, at home or in the diaspora as Anwar, little 
realise its attribution to the only Indian awardee of their 
country’s highest token of recognition, Nishan-e Pakistan, the 
late Morarji Desai (1896-1995). Prime Minister Desai, an 
austere Gujarati, was a votary of urine therapy and known to 
drink daily a glass of his own water. He died aged 99. But not 
before becoming the oldest head of government, aged 81 in 
March 1977, still unsurpassed in the Guinness Book of World 
Records. Desai got on swimmingly with another teetotaller as 
himself, Zia ul-Haq, who assumed the chief martial law 
administrator’s mantle next-door, some three months later, in 
July. In his telephone chats with Zia, cordial but candid, Desai 
allegedly dropped it to the general that he was primed, thanks to 
Indian intelligence inputs, of Pakistan’s nuclear programme at 
Kahuta. The late B. N. Raman recalled how a local mole, 
sometime in 1978, was on the verge of delivering blue prints of 
the Kahuta complex. Zia, the consummate charmer, however, 
would ingratiatingly pepper his conversations with earnest 
queries if urine must be ingested after arising or any time of the 
day. Desai ‘was sold’. The entire network, carefully cultivated 
by India’s R&AW (popularly albeit incorrectly RAW), was 
blown.   
 
Morarji Desai, a self-righteous cross between Jeremy Corbyn 
and Oliver Cromwell, believed transparency, not secrecy, was 
paramount to building fraternal relations with neighbours. 
Desai’s private secretary, Hasmukh Shah, reminisced that Zia 
‘knew Morarji was a straight person with whom he could strike 
a bargain and Morarji would stand by it.’ Desai also rebuffed 
Moshe Dayan’s suggestion to blow up Kahuta provided New 
Delhi permitted Israeli jets a forward base in Rajasthan. An 
understanding on Kashmir was in the pipeline but Desai’s 
administration, independent India’s first non-Congress router, 
sank during the monsoon of 1979. An imminent ‘break-
through’, oft recalled in the memoirs of mandarins, chimerically 
glimmer to the present. Waiting Kashmiris, among others across 
the 1947 divide, are not close readers of tragicomedies, 
especially Samuel Beckett.  
 
Zia disappeared into ash and mangoes but his successor, 
Ghulam Ishaque Khan, despatched High Commissioner Abdul 
Sattar to Bombay, despite Benazir Bhutto’s demurral, to confer 
that nonagenarian his Nishan on May 19, 1990. Desai, among 
other Bombayites, was unwary of Pakistanis bearing gifts to 
their isle. For it was in the middle of another ‘escalation’ that 
very month when Pakistanis feared a joint Indo-Israeli raid, à la 
Osirak, on Kahuta. Its chief of staff, General Aslam Beg, who 
set sail from Bombay in 1949, conveyed bluntly to New Delhi: 
‘If Israel hits us, you shall be held responsible and Bombay will 
cease to exist.’ Beg recounted it, exactly a decade later in 2000, 
to Owen Bennett-Jones (p. 205).  
 
Morarji Desai never lived to see the night skyline ablaze from 
his Marine Drive apartment, Oceana, in late November 2008. A 
ten minutes’ walk from where he was lauded by Pakistani 
diplomats stands the Oberoi Trident – previously Oberoi Towers 
where was PIA’s then Bombay office – just by the bay’s 
tapering end. It took but ten Pakistanis, Sunni males barely out 
of their teens, ostensibly despatched without Rawalpindi’s 
approval, to storm it, the Taj Mahal Palace, a Parsi charity 
hospital, and Victoria Terminus (now CST), the city’s principal 
railway station, to bring West, South and Southeast Asia’s 
largest metropolis of almost 20 millions into lockdown for more 
than 60 hours leaving 600 wounded and 166 plus dead.   
 
Bombay 26/11, as American and British security officials rue, 
‘changed everything’ (Bob Woodward, p. 47). Ditto Kashmiris 
who must loathe Pakistan and its ‘deep state’ tutees tutored in 
the arts of mayhem and murder. By 2006 a rudimentary ‘in 
principle’ agreement had been hammered, especially regarding 
troop demobilization, between Indian and Pakistani diplomats. 
The Composite Dialogue Process – pretty much compost 
despite being tentatively exhumed in 2011 – was paused so that 
Islamabad could embark on overdue weed control: the sole 
surviving perpetrator had been charge-sheeted, not 
unconvincingly, for ‘conspiracy to wage war against the 
government of India’. Khurshid Kasuri has now divulged, in his 
recently published reminiscences as foreign secretary (p. 434), 
how he ‘was horrified at the mere suggestion’ by Senators 
McCain and Graham, in the presence of Af-Pak envoy Richard 
Holbrooke, that India mulled ‘a limited air-raid on Muridke, the 
headquarters of the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s and its political wing, 
Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JUD)’ because New Delhi suspected then, 
and has been proved now, that ‘Hafiz Saeed was responsible for 
the Mumbai atrocities.’ Lt.-Gen. Shuja Pasha, ISI chief at the 
time of the carnage, flew into Langley to tell his CIA 
counterpart, General Michael Hayden, on Boxing Day 2008, 
that (Bob Woodward, p. 47): ‘There may have been people 
associated with my organization who were associated with this 
[but] That’s different from authority, direction and control.’  
 
 
 Daud Gilani (aka David Coleman Headley), the mastermind of 
Bombay 26/11, disagreed vehemently at his Chicago trial by 
insisting that it was possible only because of ‘complete support 
of the ISI’; that every attack initiated by the Lashkar-e Taiba is 
carried out with ‘full knowledge’ of its head, Hafiz Mohammad 
Said; and every senior figure of the LeT retains an exclusive ISI 
handler. Quod erat expectandum ergo demonstratum. 
 
It was familiar fare: General Vernon Walters, as Husain 
Haqqani tellingly tells in his well-wrought tale of Pakistani 
perfidy, called Zia ul-Haq a ‘most superb and patriotic liar’ who 
solemnly stated in 1982 (p. 225): ‘Pakistan might not be a large 
or important country but it was an honorable one’, and Walters, 
from one soldier to another had his word that, ‘Pakistan would 
not develop, much less explode, a nuclear weapon or explosive 
device.’  
 
The LeT, according to Bruce Riedel, is the ‘darling of the ISI’. 
Riedel pointed out to those who cared to listen in 2014: ‘Five 
years ago, on a trip to South Asia, I asked a former Pakistani 
ambassador where Osama bin Laden was hiding. The 
ambassador replied that he would be in a safe house built by 
Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, near a military 
headquarters.’ 
 
Marc Anwar has tweeted for India to be declared a terrorist state 
despite the absence, October 1989 onwards in Jammu or the 
Vale, of Kashmiri corpses with faeces stuffed in mouths. 
Cadavers of missing, mutilated Baloch insurgents are, when 
discovered by distraught relatives, as part of the Frontier Corps’ 
‘pick up and dump’ routine.  
 
Kashmiris sipping bambai chai would, in their lingo, point out 
all this to Anwar. But Mirpuri Britons, as Anwar, cannot 
comprehend for they neither speak kashur nor hail from 
Kashmir. Britain’s current deputy high commissioner to India 
and a specialist on Kashmiri affairs, Alexander Evans, remarked 
that they ‘would not be recognized as such by Valley Kashmiris 
whether in Srinagar or London.’ Likewise the anthropologist 
and director of the Centre for Applied South Asian Studies 
(CASAS), Roger Ballard, that ‘not only do they have little in 
common with the Kashmiris of the Srinagar valley’ but also 
their ‘cultural connections with the Valley proper are few’ since 
they originate in ‘the eastern and northern limits of the Potohari 
Punjabi culture which is otherwise characteristic of the upland 
parts of Rawalpindi and Jhelum districts.’  
 
Marc Anwar’s cluelessness of Kashmir matches that of Islamic 
observances. Mayor Sadiq Khan extended his bests to Jewish 
Londoners for Rosh Hashanah, Hebrew New Year 5777, which 
fell on October 3, 2016. Anwar berated him: ‘And Muharram 
@SadiqKhan sahib, or did I miss your tweet?’ It is a thoughtful 
mayor who knows, as most Muslims would, or should, that the 
Islamic new-year beginning on Muharram 1 is simply the start 
of a lunar calendar devoid of any festive signification for 
Sunnis. Or Shia.  
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